Terra Liquidity Alliance Tracker

The one-sentence version: a vote steers LUNA emissions to a pool, so we grade every pool on what a vote there is worth to Terra, and the DAO moves its votes only to pools that have earned it — four straight epochs of solid grades — or that the council names for a stated reason. Bribes never enter the decision.

The letter: five lenses, each scored against the other active pools this epoch (100 = best of the field), weighted 20 / 25 / 15 / 25 / 15 —

• Purpose — what the chain needs this kind of pool for. The only hand-set input: LUNA–stable 1.0 · LUNA–LST 0.9 · bluechip bridge 0.7 · stable–stable 0.6 · project / single 0.5. Changeable by DAO proposal.
• Work — does it facilitate trades? Utilization (volume ÷ liquidity), depth, exit slippage.
• Efficiency — what emissions buy: $ of emissions per $ traded and per $ staked; cheaper ranks higher.
• Durability — does liquidity stay? Price-neutral retention over four epochs, amplified share, IL exposure by pair type, asset durability.
• Governance — who holds the votes: Votion's share, bribe rate vs Votion's rate, cushion above 1%, PD's share of the pot. Less dependence ranks higher.

Bands: A ≥ 75 · B ≥ 60 · C ≥ 45 · D ≥ 30 · F. A number with no trustworthy source is blank, never zero — it drops the pool's confidence instead. Streak = consecutive epochs at C or better: the "earned" counter.

How the DAO votes (the Advisor): an existing pool earns aDAO votes with four consecutive epochs at C+; a new, inactive or unsupported pool only through a reason the council declares (supporting a struggling ally is that mechanism); bribes are never a factor — what our votes earn is a bonus reported elsewhere; and a change becomes a proposal only when it is at least 10% more system value and every pool it points at has earned it. System value per 10% chunk = the composite × 1.5 for a good pool sliding toward 1% × (1 − 0.7 × the share Votion already plans to bring) × diminishing as our share grows; 50% cap per pool. When a bucket is proposable, the exact gauge-controller vote message is generated for the council.

Who else votes: ~28% of TLA VP is Votion, moving mechanically to the best bribe per vote (the Overview's Vote Market reproduces its optimizer). A bribe exists for Votion only if its pot is funded for the period being voted.

The PD Bribe Tracker: PD's own proposal titles state its criterion ("trading efficiency + volume"). The tracker applies that criterion to every active Astroport TLA pool at placement, shows PD's allocation beside each pool's rank, the pools that outranked a bribed pool and got nothing, and the drift through each four-epoch window. It draws no conclusion; it shows the arithmetic beside the stated rule.

Declared: the Purpose table, weights, bands, the 4-epoch streak, the 10% threshold, council reasons — all published, all changeable by proposal. Measured: everything else, and every row opens to its numbers. Not captured yet, and labeled: Skeleton Swap volume, the Credia market, LP-holder concentration. Full guide: Docs → How we grade pools & how the DAO votes (source ↗) — the help bot has read it.